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ABSTRACT
Since its inception, litigation finance has steadily grown in
prevalence and popularity in the United States. While many
scholars have examined its merits, few have considered litigation
finance specifically in the context of copyright law. This is most
unfortunate, for there, a vicious cycle has taken hold: high
litigation costs discourage many market participants from taking
cases to trial or summary judgment in order to vindicate their legal
rights, even when they have strong cases. Thus, parties settle
almost every case, which in turn prevents resolution of
longstanding precedential questions in critical areas of copyright
law. The legal uncertainty resulting from this precedential
gridlock generates higher avoidance costs and poses more
financial risks for market participants, particularly less-heeled or
less-established parties.
This Note proposes one way in which litigation finance could
help break that cycle. Specifically, rights holders and defendants
alike can use litigation finance to fund strategic-litigation
campaigns to pressure the development of precedent. To illustrate
how this might work, this Note examines litigation finance in the
narrow context of music copyright, an area that perfectly illustrates
the problems besetting copyright law writ large. In doing so, this
Note flips a popular criticism of litigation finance on its head:
while some scholars argue that litigation finance can distort
litigation strategy by encouraging litigants to reject mutually
beneficial settlements, it is normatively desirable to do so given the
unsettled state of music copyright law.
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INTRODUCTION
It is well-established in innumerable contexts that “the squeakiest
wheel gets the grease.” But what happens when squeaking costs money—a
whole lot of money, in fact? Absent other factors, the inevitable result is
that only the best-heeled wheels get the attention they seek.
Enter the contemporary civil litigation market.1 Owing to the high
costs of discovery, expert witnesses, legal representation, and other factors,
the cost of vindicating one’s legal rights in civil court, either as plaintiff or
defendant, has steadily increased for more than two decades.2 And
copyright claims have not been spared from this trend. In fact, some argue
that high litigation costs are particularly vexatious for copyright litigants.3
But the market has not gone gently into that good night. Instead of
surrendering civil litigation entirely to the province of the most gilded rights
holders, entrepreneurs have developed litigation finance as a means to
facilitate greater access to cash for aspiring litigants of varying economic
means.4 Under the litigation finance model, a prospective litigant—
1

See Michael Zhang, The High Cost of Suing for Copyright Infringements,
PETAPIXEL (June 4, 2015), http://petapixel.com/2015/06/04/the-high-cost-of-suingfor-copyright-infringements (discussing how high litigation costs discourage suing
even obvious copyright infringers).
2
See Lawyers for Civil Justice, Civil Justice Reform Grp. & U.S. Chamber Inst. for
Legal Reform, Litigation Cost Survey of Major Companies, Statement for
Presentation to Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, Judicial Conference
of the United States at Duke Law School 2010 Conference on Civil Litigation 2
(May 10–11, 2010), http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/litigation_cost_
survey_of_major_companies_0.pdf (noting steady increases from 2000 to 2008 and
observing that American corporations spend far more on litigation than
corporations in other countries).
3
See, e.g., David Walker, Daniel Morel and the High Cost of Copyright
Infringement Claims, PHOTO DISTRICT NEWS (June 3, 2015),
www.pdnonline.com/features/Daniel-Morel-and-the-High-Cost-of-CopyrightInfringement-Claims (noting “the costs of pursuing copyright claims—especially
against wellfunded [sic] opponents—can far exceed the maximum damages that
plaintiffs can recover under the law,” and that “[t]he law is structured so there’s
little incentive for attorneys to take on a copyright case even if it appears to be a
drop-dead winner” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting a copyright
plaintiff’s attorney)).
4
See Jonathan T. Molot, The Feasibility of Litigation Markets, 89 IND. L.J. 171,
173–74 (2014) (“Litigation finance enables the top-flight lawyer at an hourly fee
firm to represent a small plaintiff with a meritorious claim even if the client cannot
afford his or her hourly bills and his or her firm refuses to agree to contingent fee
arrangements.”); Charles Agee, Litigation Finance Considerations for Large
Corporate Clients, WESTFLEET ADVISORS BLOG (Sept. 28, 2014), http://westfleet
advisors.com/blog/litigation-financing-considerations-large-corporate-clients
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presumably in response to either attorney referral or direct advertising—
contacts a litigation financing firm and applies for funding.5 Thereafter, an
employee interviews the applicant to gather additional information, reviews
the claim, assesses its merits and likelihood of success, and decides whether
to fund the costs of the lawsuit.6 When they do award funds, most litigation
finance firms do so on a nonrecourse basis, meaning that the firm will only
collect its pre-negotiated return if the litigant wins the case.7 For plaintiffs,
this usually includes a share of the judgment on top of attorney’s fees.8 For
defendants, this usually means collecting an out-of-pocket interest premium
from the defendant in addition to attorney’s fees.9 It is axiomatic, therefore,
that risks are high for the funding entity. As a result, most charge high
interest rates to justify the risks of funding uncertain suits.10
Since its inception, litigation finance has steadily grown in
prevalence and popularity, particularly in European nations.11 In the United
States, while legal and ethical uncertainties may have initially hampered the
model’s growth,12 the patchwork of ethical and legal restrictions casting
doubt on its validity has loosened in recent years.13 As a result, litigation
finance is now “booming” in the United States.14
(discussing how large corporations can use litigation finance to preserve capital for
other investments).
5
Mariel Rodak, Note, It’s About Time: A System’s Thinking Analysis of the
Litigation Finance Industry and Its Effect on Settlement, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 503,
506 (2006).
6
Id.
7
Id. at 506–07.
8
Id. at 506.
9
William Alden, New Firm Plans To Invest in Lawsuits, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK
(Apr. 8, 2013, 7:24 AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/04/08/new-firm-plansto-invest-in-lawsuits.
10
Rodak, supra note 5, at 506.
11
See George R. Barker, Third-Party Litigation Funding in Australia and Europe,
8 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 451, 522 (2012) (“The UK and certainly continental Europe
can be considered more grown up about funding of large commercial disputes than
the US. Germany, Europe’s largest economy, has enjoyed an active and mature
funding market for more than 10 years, which makes it—together with Australia—
one of the world’s early movers in this respect.”).
12
See generally Susan Lorde Martin, The Litigation Financing Industry: The Wild
West of Finance Should Be Tamed Not Outlawed, 10 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L.
55 (2004) (canvassing the various legal and ethical obstacles—particularly state
common law “champerty” doctrines—to litigation finance).
13
See Carol Langford, Betting on the Client: Alternative Litigation Funding Is an
Ethically Risky Proposition for Attorneys and Clients, 49 U.S.F. L. REV. 237, 238
(2015) (“Currently, twenty-seven out of fifty-one jurisdictions—including Arizona,
Colorado, California, New Hampshire, New Mexico, Texas, and D.C.—permit
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Despite this rapid growth and the scholarly attention accompanying
it, one question remains largely unexplored: what can the model do for
music copyright? This Note suggests that the strategic use of litigation
finance can help copyright law “promote the progress”15 by enabling parties
to vindicate their rights and break the current precedential deadlock in
music copyright law. This Note thus flips a popular criticism of litigation
finance on its head: while some scholars argue that litigation finance can
distort litigation strategy by encouraging litigants to reject mutually
beneficial settlements, it is normatively desirable to do so given the current
state of music copyright law.
This outcome is desirable because high costs should not shut out
lesser-heeled parties—like new and less-known artists and indie labels—
from driving the development of legal precedent to further their interests.
Rather, the practice of strategically pursuing litigation through to final
judgment in multiple courts and jurisdictions to spur favorable precedential
development (a type of judicial “rent seeking”16) is integral to American
legal development, and there is strong historical precedent to light the path
ahead. Thus, by using litigation finance to fund otherwise cost-prohibitive
lawsuits all the way through judgment, these stakeholders can use litigation
finance to more effectively seek rent in the judicial process. Put differently,
less-heeled “wheels” in the music industry can use litigation finance to
“squeak louder” in order to get the precedential grease.
Focusing on music copyright is justified for two reasons. First,
while scholars have written volumes about litigation finance in general, they
have scarcely examined its impacts upon copyright law. Moreover, none
have specifically considered music copyright, a legal field in particular need
of precedential development and one that can serve as a model for legal
development in other unsettled fields. Second, music copyright exemplifies
an area where rapid technological development has impacted and outpaced
the law. An examination of music copyright can therefore illustrate how
litigation finance encourages precedential development in areas where
technology demands greater judicial flexibility.
some form of champerty, so long as there is no intermeddling with how the
litigation is conducted, the suit is not frivolous, and there is no malice champerty at
play.”).
14
See Jason Krause, Third-Party Financing Is Growing, and Lawyers Are Big
Players, A.B.A. J. (July 1, 2016, 2:00 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/
article/third_party_financing_is_growing_and_lawyers_are_big_players (“In May
[2016], Burford Capital released results of an online survey showing 28 percent of
responding private practice lawyers say their firms have used litigation financing,
as compared to the 7 percent reported in 2013.”).
15
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
16
See infra notes 83–84 and accompanying text.

No. 1]

DUKE LAW & TECHNOLOGY REVIEW

273

Part I of this Note briefly canvasses litigation finance’s historical
and analytical background to provide context. Part II introduces the concept
of judicial rent seeking and, importantly, will distinguish the concept of
legitimate rent seeking advocated here from the term’s more ominous
meaning in other scholarship. Part III explains music copyright law’s
“precedent problem,” and then unites these threads by analyzing their
applicability in, and utility to, music copyright.

I. BACKGROUND: A PRIMER ON LITIGATION FINANCE
A. A Brief History
Concerns about high litigation costs are nothing new. Take, for
example, “talking-machine” phonograph manufacturers who argued that
what would eventually become the 1909 Copyright Act would
unconstitutionally “plunge[]” them “into . . . long and expensive litigation
as would necessarily ensue if this bill becomes a law.”17 Or take publishers
who conversely argued that “[n]o single [musical] publisher” could afford
“to carry on such an expensive litigation, because these music publishers are
not the millionaires that our friends on the other side have attempted to
point out and show,” and further that “no single composer would be able to
supply the funds to carry on such a litigation.”18 And not only do concerns
about parties’ financial positions as expositors of judicial success track the
inception of federal copyright protection in the United States, they also
track the common law development of litigation in Western nations
generally.19 In sum, concerns about the cost of litigation are a time-honored
tradition in the Western legal system.
The concept of third-party financiers as champions of the lessresourced is not novel either. In fact, the ancient common law doctrines of
maintenance, champerty, and barratry were all developed in medieval
England to regulate wealthy persons who funded others’ land-dispute
claims in exchange for a share of the land they received at final judgment.20
17

Arguments Before the Comm. on Patents of the H.R., Conjointly with the S.
Comm. on Patents, on H.R. 19853, To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting
Copyright, 59th Cong. 157 (1906) (statement of Paul H. Cromelin, Vice President,
Columbia Phonograph Co.).
18
See id. at 203 (statement of Nathan Burkan, esq.) (discussing how expensive
litigation is for poor composers).
19
See M.J. Russell, Trial by Battle and the Appeals of Felony, 1 J. LEGAL HIST.
135, 145 (1980) (noting that “hired champions”—mercenaries hired to fight in
place of criminal defendants in trials by battle—were prohibited because they
would tie the outcome of trials by battle on the parties’ relative financial positions
instead of on divine adjudication of guilt or innocence).
20
Michael Elliott, Note, Trial by Social-Media: The Rise of Litigation
Crowdfunding, 84 U. CIN. L. REV. 529, 541 (2016).
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However, the modern form of litigation finance developed much
more recently. The model was likely pioneered in Australia in the 1990s.21
Owing largely to Australia’s legal and ethical framework, which was more
favorable to the model than those of other nations, litigation finance steadily
gained in popularity there in subsequent years.22 Since then, litigation
finance has spread unevenly to other countries,23 but has gained traction in
many European nations like England and Germany.24
In the United States, litigation finance was probably introduced by
Las Vegas businessman (and felon) Perry Walton, the “self-proclaimed
father of the modern litigation finance industry.”25 Thereafter, the model
steadily increased in prominence and prevalence, aided by the parallel
collapse of antiquated common law champerty doctrines and the like in
many jurisdictions.26 That steady growth grew into a “boom” in the 2010s,
with empirical studies suggesting that litigation finance firms have appeared
and granted money during those years at levels exceeding those in previous
decades by orders of magnitude.27 Today, the model continues to grow by
embracing new sources of capital, including the increasingly pervasive
populist-financing model known as “crowdsourcing.”28
21

Geoffrey J. Lysaught & D. Scott Hazelgrove, Economic Implications of ThirdParty Litigation Financing on the U.S. Civil Justice System, 8 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y
645, 648 (2012).
22
See id. at 648–49 (explaining the ways in which Australia’s legal system
promoted litigation finance and litigation finance’s corresponding popularity
increase there).
23
See id.at 649 (canvassing the development of litigation finance in Australia and
its mixed reception in civil-law countries).
24
See Barker, supra note 11, at 522 (“The UK and certainly continental Europe can
be considered more grown up about funding of large commercial disputes than the
US. Germany, Europe's largest economy, has enjoyed an active and mature
funding market for more than 10 years, which makes it—together with Australia—
one of the world's early movers in this respect.”).
25
Rodak, supra note 5, at 505.
26
See id. (citing Adam Liptak, Lenders to Those Who Sue Are Challenged on
Rates: In Ohio Case, Court Says Fees Are Too High, N.Y. TIMES, May 19, 2003, at
A15); Liptak, supra, at A15 (“[A]n erosion of the prohibition on investing in
others’ lawsuits, or champerty, has helped create the industry.”).
27
See Krause, supra note 14 (“In May [2016], Burford Capital released results of
an online survey showing 28 percent of responding private practice lawyers say
their firms have used litigation financing, as compared to the 7 percent reported in
2013.”).
28
See generally Elliott, supra note 20; Brian Willis, Crowdfunding Solar: Access to
Populist Capital, TIGERCOMM: SCALINGGREEN (Jan. 29, 2013),
http://scalinggreen.tigercomm.us/2013/01/crowdfunding-solar-access-to-populouscapital (“Crowdfunding is populism’s answer to the bank . . . .”).
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B. Justifications for Litigation Finance
Proponents have advanced many arguments to justify litigation
finance, and this Note does not attempt to review them all. However, it is
possible to sample the model’s principal advantages, grouped by three
distinct justifications.
The first and most widely argued is that litigation finance opens
courtroom doors for parties with limited financial means.29 Absent thirdparty financing, parties who cannot afford to sustain litigation while waiting
for their prospective settlement or award do not have the means to bring a
suit. That contingency fees exist to combat this problem does not
undermine this argument, proponents assert, because litigation financing is
a far more flexible and widely available option.30
Second, proponents argue that litigation finance enables assistance
beyond the forwarding of costs to those who cannot afford to raise or
defend against a claim. For example, some point out that many litigation
financiers also advance related funds like living expenses for tort victims
deprived of job income during extended court battles.31 Others point to the

See, e.g., Martin, supra note 12, at 77 (“Litigation financing firms provide an
option to plaintiffs with good cases but with meager or no financial resources.”).
30
Professors David S. Abrams and Daniel L. Chen provide an excellent overview
of the key differences between litigation financing and traditional contingency fees
in David S. Abrams & Daniel L. Chen, A Market for Justice: A First Empirical
Look at Third Party Litigation Funding, 15 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 1075, 1079 (2013).
They summarize those differences as follows:
The most prominent difference is that the potential funder in the contingency fee
system must be an attorney. This can lead to some less desirable outcomes relative
to litigation trading. For example, limiting potential funders to attorneys
necessarily restricts the liquidity of the market for litigation, meaning that some
positive expectation claims still may not be pursued because of an inability to find
financing. It also may skew the claims that do get funded in favor of those that fit
the risk profile of litigators. Many contingency-fee attorneys are unlikely to work
on cases that have a low chance of success, even if the expected value is high. The
contingency fee system also ends up imposing a large cost on clients, usually in the
range of thirty percent—an amount that could be substantially decreased in a more
competitive market for funding.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
31
See Max Volsky, A Brief Introduction to Litigation Finance, LEXSHARES 2
(2016), https://www.lexshares.com/Legal_Finance_Summary_Volsky.pdf (“The
first [type of litigation financing agreement offered by LexShares] is the lawsuit
advance for tort claims, which provides funding to individual plaintiffs for living
expenses during protracted litigation.”).
29
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fact that litigation financing allows less-resourced parties to hire more
expensive and competent legal counsel.32
Finally, and most saliently, proponents argue that in regimes similar
to American copyright, third-party financing serves an important function
by allowing less-resourced litigants to overcome cost barriers to using the
law as it was actually intended: to deter violators and protect the important
interests of legal rights holders.33 In other words, where a legal system
largely depends upon litigation to validate rights but that litigation is
prohibitively expensive, access to cash is essential to the system’s
operation.34 Proponents therefore assert that, by ensuring that access,
litigation finance plays an important equalizing role.35

C. Problems with Litigation Finance
Litigation finance has its warts, however. Three are particularly
noteworthy. First is the specter of undue case influence. Many
commentators—including members of Congress—have expressed concern
that financiers pose serious risks to parties’ decision-making and control of
their cases.36 They contend that, regardless of financiers’ attestations to the
32

E.g., Radek Goral, Skin in the Game: Why Business Lawsuits Get Third-Party
Funded, 30 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 247, 247 (2015).
33
Professor Syamkrishna Balganesh applies this argument specifically to the
copyright realm:
When individuals know that the costs of litigation make it unlikely that suits will be
brought, the law’s ability to deter behavior begins to diminish in large measure. If
litigation costs can influence a regime’s ability to deter behavior, they must in equal
measure be able to influence a regime's ability to incentivize behavior as well. And
if copyright’s primary purpose lies in providing creators with an incentive to
create—as courts and policymakers routinely reiterate—then rising litigation costs
will, in a similar vein, impede the system’s realization of its core objective.
Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Copyright Infringement Markets, 113 COLUM. L. REV.
2277, 2290 (2013) (footnote omitted).
34
Id.
35
Id. at 2291.
36
See Sara Randazzo, Lawmakers Taking Closer Look at Litigation Funding,
WALL ST. J.: L. BLOG (Aug. 27, 2015 4:22 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2015/08/
27/senators-call-for-transparency-in-litigation-funding (“While proponents of the
“litigation finance” industry say it helps level the playing field for those who would
otherwise be unable to pursue lawsuits, critics have long complained that such
third-party investors give outsiders undue influence over legal decisions and allow
frivolous lawsuits to go forward, driving up the overall cost of litigation.”); Letter
from Sen. Charles E. Grassley, Chairman, U.S. Senate Judiciary Comm., & Sen.
John Cornyn, Chairman, Subcomm. on the Constitution, to Sir Peter Middleton,
Chairman, Burford Capital 12 (Aug. 27, 2015), http://www.grassley.senate.gov/
sites/default/files/judiciary/upload/2015-08-27%20CEG%2C%20Cornyn%20to
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contrary, third parties whose financial success is directly tied to a case’s
success are unavoidably more likely to meddle with the case’s
management.37
Second, critics argue that litigation finance encourages frivolous
litigation.38 This encouragement, they argue, stems from the fact that thirdparty-funded claims do not benefit from the self-interested gatekeeping that
attorneys working on contingency bases perform.39 In other words, purely
out of economic self-interest, attorneys who front their own money to their
clients are less likely to agree to pursue meritless cases.
Finally, critics argue that litigation finance has a distortionary effect
on the settlement process. They assert that the practice improperly
influences settlement decisions by encouraging parties to eschew
meritorious settlement offers in favor of pushing cases through to final
judgment, even when settlement would otherwise be the most mutually
beneficial option. As they see it, “[a] plaintiff who must pay a finance
company out of the proceeds of any recovery can be expected to reject what
may otherwise be a fair settlement offer and hold out for a larger sum of
money.”40
%20Burford%20Capital%20%28Commerical%20Litigation%20Funding%29.pdf
(“[W]hile commercial litigation lenders maintain that plaintiffs retain control over
litigation and settlement decisions, the terms and fundamental structure of
agreements that are publicly available call into question these assertions.”).
37
JOHN BEISNER, JESSICA MILLER & GARY RUBIN, SELLING LAWSUITS, BUYING
TROUBLE: THIRD-PARTY LITIGATION FUNDING IN THE UNITED STATES, U.S.
CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM 7 (2009), http://www.instituteforlegalreform.
com/uploads/sites/1/thirdpartylitigationfinancing.pdf
(“[L]itigation-financing
arrangements undercut the plaintiff ’s control over his or her own claim because
investors inherently desire to protect their investment and will therefore seek to
exert control over strategic decisions in the lawsuit.”).
38
Joanna M. Shepherd, Economic Conundrums in Search of a Solution: The
Functions of Third-Party Litigation Finance, 47 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 919, 950 (2015).
39
See BEISNER ET AL., supra note 37, at 5 (“What is more, third-party financing
particularly increases the volume of questionable claims. This is because, absent
such financing, attorneys have two incentives not to permit their clients to bring
such claims. First, they have a duty to advise clients when potential claims would
be frivolous. And second, when lawyers are working on contingency, they
obviously would rather spend their finite time on cases that are likely to be
successful, as opposed to cases with a low probability of success. Accordingly,
absent third-party funding, cases that plaintiffs and their attorneys actually decide to
file ordinarily can be expected to be of higher merit than cases that plaintiffs and
their attorneys decide not to file. When third-party litigation financing increases
the overall volume of litigation, however, those weak cases that plaintiffs and their
attorneys ordinarily would not have pursued are much more likely to be filed.”).
40
Id. at 6.
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This concern has been borne out in at least one case, Rancman v.
Interim Settlement Funding Corp.,41 where the Supreme Court of Ohio held
that litigation financing constituted champerty and maintenance under Ohio
law because it “provided Rancman with a disincentive to settle her case.”42
In reaching its decision, the court observed that Rancman’s finance
agreement with her litigation funder created “an absolute disincentive to
settle” her case for less than $24,000 “because she would keep the $6,000
advance” afforded her by their agreement, but “would not receive any
additional money from a $24,000 settlement.”43 Thus, her only prospects
for recovering more than the advance she received would be to win a
judgment in excess of $24,000, while at the same time the guaranteed
advance she already received ensured that she risked no financial loss by
rejecting the otherwise fair settlement in favor of pursuing a heavier
verdict.44
***
In sum, litigation finance presents both tantalizing litigationequalizing benefits and disturbing policy concerns. In the next Part, this
Note returns to these justifications and concerns to illustrate that litigation
finance can be used for particularly meritorious ends in the realm of music
copyright law.

II. LITIGATION FINANCE AND MUSIC COPYRIGHT
A. Copyright’s Precedent Problem
Copyright (and music copyright, by incorporation) has a precedent
problem. Legal standards ranging from fair use,45 to the de minimis
defense46 in music sampling, to the degree of service-provider knowledge
41

Rancman v. Interim Settlement Funding Corp., 789 N.E.2d 217 (Ohio 2003).
Id. at 220.
43
Id.
44
See id.
45
Compare Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 705–06 (2d Cir. 2013)
(“Transformative works lie at the heart of the fair use doctrine’s guarantee of
breathing space.” (alterations omitted) (quoting Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music,
Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994))), with Kienitz v. Sconnie Nation LLC, 766 F.3d
756, 758 (7th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 191 L. Ed. 2d 638 (2015) (“To say that a new
use transforms the work is precisely to say that it is derivative and thus, one might
suppose, protected under § 106(2). Cariou and its predecessors in the Second
Circuit do no [sic] explain how every ‘transformative use’ can be ‘fair use’ without
extinguishing the author's rights under § 106(2). We think it best to stick with the
statutory list . . . .”).
46
Compare VMG Salsoul, LLC v. Ciccone, 824 F.3d 871, 874 (9th Cir. 2016)
(“We hold that the ‘de minimis’ exception applies to infringement actions
42
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necessary to survive summary judgment in digital-content-infringement
cases47 are inconsistent across the country, despite the fact that Congress
sought to create a harmonious nationwide scheme when it passed a federal
statute governing copyright.48
Sampling of sound recordings is a prime example of how this
unsettled legal state impacts the music industry. Although the practice of
borrowing portions of others’ works is certainly nothing new,49 creative
experimentation with sampling heated up dramatically in the 1980s and
1990s when technology began to make it easier and cheaper to directly
reproduce and manipulate sound recordings.50 Indeed, entire genres have
since evolved around the art of creative sampling.51

concerning copyrighted sound recordings, just as it applies to all other copyright
infringement actions.”), with Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 410 F.3d
792, 801 (6th Cir. 2005) (“Get a license or do not sample.”).
47
Compare Capitol Records, LLC v. Vimeo, LLC, 826 F.3d 78, 97 (2d Cir. 2016)
(holding that the fact that infringing works were being played on service-provider
platforms even where “copyrighted music . . . was to some extent viewed (or even
viewed in its entirety) by some employee of a service provider” was not sufficient
to prove the actual or “red flag knowledge” necessary to invoke an exception to the
DMCA’s service-provider safe harbor), with Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v.
Fung, 710 F.3d 1020, 1043 (9th Cir. 2013) (“The material in question was
sufficiently current and well-known that it would have been objectively obvious to
a reasonable person that the material solicited and assisted was both copyrighted
and not licensed to random members of the public, and that the induced use was
therefore infringing.”).
48
See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, FEDERAL PROTECTION FOR PRE-1972 SOUND
RECORDINGS: A REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS 121 (2011),
http://www.copyright.gov/docs/sound/pre-72-report.pdf (“National uniformity of
copyright law ensures that all users, consumers, intermediaries, and right holders
are operating under a single, consistent set of laws.”).
49
See, e.g., Computer Music, A Brief History of Sampling, MUSICRADAR (Aug. 5,
2014), http://www.musicradar.com/tuition/tech/a-brief-history-of-sampling-604868
(noting that “digital sampling has been in existence since the 1960s”); Pàdraic
Grant, Mainstream Sampling—Innovation & Scorn, PERFECT SOUND FOREVER
(Oct. 2007), http://www.furious.com/perfect/sampling.html (observing that the
early twentiethth-century classical genre known as “[m]usique concrete is perhaps
the most useful as a starting point in the history of sampling” because it “was
rooted in attempts at new forms of classical composition” that relied largely on “the
utilisation and reinterpretation of existing material to create original works of art”).
50
See Computer Music, supra note 49 (“Thanks to digital technology’s decreasing
manufacturing costs, the first relatively cheap samplers began to appear in the midto-late ’80s.”).
51
See id. (noting that hardcore rave “couldn't have existed before the advent of the
sampler”); Grant, supra note 49 (documenting how sampling was instrumental to
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But with those technological and creative advances came lawsuits.
Those lawsuits revealed an uncertain interaction between copyright law and
sampling of sound recordings. Cases involving the de minimis defense52
are illustrative. The question arising in those cases is whether the de
minimis defense is available at all in sampling cases. The primary source of
this disagreement arises from the language in 17 U.S.C. § 114, which states
that sound recording rights “do not extend to the making or duplication of
another sound recording that consists entirely of an independent fixation of
other sounds.”53 The Sixth Circuit concluded that under a literal approach
to that text, the word “entirely” suggests that artists cannot sample any
portion of another’s work, regardless of how small that sample may be.54 In
contrast, the Ninth Circuit concluded that under either approach—but
particularly a purposive approach—that the passage was clearly intended as
a rights-limiting provision suggests that the provision should not be read to
substantially expand rights.55 Additionally, nothing in the language
indicates an intention to abandon the de minimis exception solely with
respect to sound recordings when it consistently applies throughout
copyright law writ large.56
There are also policy disagreements. Proponents of the defense
maintain that sampling cases are no different than any other claims, and that
the de minimis defense should therefore apply.57 In contrast, critics of the
defense argue that sampling is more akin to physical theft because it
involves brazenly using portions of others’ songs.58 Regardless of how
these arguments should be resolved, the dispute demonstrates that the 1976
Copyright Act’s text is unclear on the topic of sampling of sound
hip hop’s development, and noting that sampling was “a basis for some of the most
interesting and revered music of its time”).
52
The de minimis defense allows an alleged infringer to assert that the portions they
copied from others’ works were too small or inconsequential to amount to
copyright infringement. See Newton v. Diamond, 388 F.3d 1189, 1192–93 (9th
Cir. 2004) (“For an unauthorized use of a copyrighted work to be actionable, the
use must be significant enough to constitute infringement.”).
53
17 U.S.C. § 114(b) (2012) (emphasis added).
54
Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 410 F.3d 792, 800 (6th Cir. 2005).
55
VMG Salsoul, LLC v. Ciccone, 824 F.3d 871, 881–83 (9th Cir. 2016).
56
Id. at 882.
57
See, e.g., id. (“[N]othing in [the 1976 Copyright Act] suggests differential
treatment of de minimis copying of sound recordings compared to, say,
sculptures.”).
58
See, e.g., Grand Upright Music Ltd. v. Warner Bros. Records, Inc., 780 F. Supp.
182, 183, 185 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (equating sampling to a violation of Moses’s
Seventh Commandment, characterizing the practice as a “callous disregard for the
law and for the rights of others,” and referring case to the U.S. Attorney to consider
federal criminal prosecution).
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recordings. This is unsurprising considering that the practice was virtually
unheard of at the time the law was passed.59
Unsurprisingly, the circuits have not resolved this issue in a
uniform manner. The Sixth Circuit was the first to address the issue and
held in Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films60 that the de minimis
defense is practically unavailable in sampling cases.61 Despite garnering
volumes of scholarly and industry criticism,62 Bridgeport stood alone
among circuit-court decisions on the de minimis question for a decade
thereafter.
Furthermore, and perhaps even more confusing to the industry,
precedential development is excruciatingly slow in the circuit courts.
Sampling is again instructive. After the Sixth Circuit’s controversial denial
of the de minimis defense in Bridgeport, no circuit addressed the issue for
over a decade. Finally, in 2016, the Ninth Circuit created (yet another)
circuit split in copyright by holding in VMG Salsoul v. Ciccione63 that the
de minimis defense is in fact available in sampling cases.64 This decision—
though likely textually and logically correct—thus creates even more
uncertainty throughout the nation over what constitutes music copyright
infringement. As one commentator sarcastically exclaimed, “Let the forum
shopping for music sampling copyright infringement claims and declaratory
judgment actions begin!”65
In sum, while rapid technological progress has changed the ways in
which artists create music and their fans listen to and buy that music, the
contemporary state of music copyright law remains unsettled in important
and perhaps even market-defining ways. Simply put, the courts have not
kept up.

59

See Computer Music, supra note 49 and accompanying text.
Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 410 F.3d 792 (6th Cir. 2005).
61
Id. at 801.
62
See generally, e.g., John Schietinger, Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films:
How the Sixth Circuit Missed a Beat on Digital Music Sampling, 55 DEPAUL L.
REV. 209 (2005) (positing numerous ways in which Bridgeport represents “a
problematic and potentially harmful decision”).
63
VMG Salsoul, LLC v. Ciccone, 824 F.3d 871 (9th Cir. 2016).
64
Id. at 874.
65
Mark H. Wittow & Eliza Hall, Sometimes Borrowing Isn’t Stealing: De Minimis
Sampling of Music Sound Recordings Isn’t Copyright Infringement, Say Two Key
Courts in the United States and Germany, K&L GATES (June 16, 2016),
http://www.klgates.com/sometimes-borrowing-isnt-stealing-de-minimis-samplingof-music-sound-recordings-isnt-copyright-infringement-say-two-key-courts-in-theunited-states-and-germany-06-16-2016.
60
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B. How Litigation Costs Distort Music Copyright Law
Although many factors prevent the law from keeping up with
technological and market changes in the music industry, high litigation
costs are chief among them. When parties almost always settle, courts have
almost no opportunity to make precedent. Because precedent makes the law
more predictable for industry players, extremely frequent settlement distorts
the law by feeding perpetual unpredictability.
That is exactly what is happening in music copyright law.
Copyright cases are even more expensive than other types of already
expensive civil cases, averaging greater than three times the cost of an
average civil suit.66 In fact, the music industry has developed a series of
risk-averse, prophylactic practices to avoid expensive litigation at all
costs.67 These practices include “[n]eedless licenses, clearances, and
permissions—which are expensive, but cost less than litigation.”68
Shyamkrishna Balganesh asserts that these practices are “the norm among
users and copiers, even when wholly unnecessary as a legal matter, and they
are often motivated entirely by the impulse to avoid costly litigation.”69
Further, defendants settle the vast majority of music copyright claims much
earlier in the litigation process, largely to curb the cost of going to trial.70
Charles Cronin recently explained that “[m]usic infringement claims tend to
be settled early on, with financially successful defendants doling out
basically extorted payoffs to potential plaintiffs rather than facing
expensive, protracted and embarrassing litigation.”71 But high costs do not
just alter the behavior of music copyright defendants. They are just as
likely to influence the litigation strategy of prospective plaintiffs. In fact,
citing empirical studies, Balganesh asserts that “[l]itigating a copyright
claim is no longer an affordable prospect for a vast majority of authors and

AM. INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW ASS’N, REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC SURVEY 2011,
at 35 (2011).
67
Balganesh, supra note 33, at 2280.
68
Id.
69
Id.
70
See id. (“On the defendant side, users and copiers of creative works are, for
identical reasons, all too reluctant to defend themselves in court when threatened
with an infringement lawsuit, and go to extreme lengths to avoid the risk of being
sued, even when their actions are fully defensible under copyright’s fair use
doctrine.” (footnote omitted)).
71
Ben Sisario & Noah Smith, ‘Blurred Lines’ Infringed on Marvin Gaye Copyright,
Jury Rules, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 10, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/11/
business/media/blurred-lines-infringed-on-marvin-gaye-copyright-jury-rules.html
(quoting Mr. Cronin).
66
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creators.”72 Thus, it is entirely reasonable to assume that many copyright
holders choose, as a matter of pure economic necessity, to forego suing
known infringers and thus leave violation of their legal rights unmitigated.73
More concerning, high copyright litigation costs—and the litigant
behavior they coerce—generate far more insidious externalities: they are
problematic for music copyright (and copyright law writ large) because they
“have a distortionary effect on copyright law and policy.”74 In particular,
they undermine copyright law’s central purpose to “promote the progress of
the arts and sciences” in two ways. First, they erode copyright owners’
faith in the legal system’s ability to vindicate the hard-won fruits of their
creative labors.75 Second, they undermine defendants’ access to “safety
valves—such as the fair use doctrine and other limitations and exceptions to
exclusive rights”—by forcing defendants to adopt “litigation-avoidance
strategies” and thereby abandon those defenses long before they are ripe for
“judicial determination.”76
This cocktail of lost plaintiff faith in copyright law and defendant
litigation avoidance at nearly any cost has caused, or at least contributed to,
the disturbingly unsettled state of many aspects of music copyright law.
They have done so by jointly breeding a circular system: prospective
plaintiffs with limited financial backing are, by way of cash shortage and
cloudy prospects of success, doubly dissuaded from bringing suits or
fighting suits brought against them all the way to completion. Further,
well-heeled litigants can perpetuate this system by strategically negotiating
pre-trial settlements to avoid undesired precedent and further pursuing only
those cases that are economically advantageous or stand to benefit their
See Balganesh, supra note 33, at 2280 (“Litigating a copyright claim is no longer
an affordable prospect for a vast majority of authors and creators. As of 2011, the
average cost of litigating a copyright infringement case through trial, for either
plaintiff or defendant—excluding judgment and awards—was estimated to range
from $384,000 to a staggering $2 million. To individual, small business, or noncommercial creators, all of who are intended beneficiaries of copyright, copyright
litigation remains an unaffordable proposition.” (footnote omitted)).
73
Cf. Lee Wilson, If You Want To Sue for Copyright Infringement, GRAPHIC
ARTISTS GUILD, https://graphicartistsguild.org/tools_resources/if-you-want-to-sue
(last visited Dec. 3, 2016) (“People who believe that their copyrights have been
infringed often have no idea how complicated copyright infringement lawsuits are.
This doesn’t mean that there are no issues worth going to court over—litigation is
sometimes the only way to settle some disputes or to pursue that elusive goal,
justice. However, the U. S. judicial system is so complex that a lawsuit can leave
you as bloodied as a fistfight; even if you win you are bruised by the experience.”).
74
Balganesh, supra note 33, at 2280.
75
Id.
76
Id. at 2280–81.
72
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positions.77 In either circumstance, the onus undeniably falls on settlement,
rather than on developing precedent. Given these realities, it should come
as no surprise that the number of copyright lawsuits in America has
consistently and dramatically fallen in recent years.78 Therefore, legal risk
and uncertainty have ensued in force. Litigants who do brave the
treacherous, unexplored waters of music copyright litigation by taking their
cases all the way to trial must truly sail into the unknown with little sense of
their prospects for winning it all or losing their shirts.79

III. HOW LITIGATION FINANCE CAN HELP
A. Rent Seeking, Precedent, and Purposeful Ambiguity
Critics argue that litigation finance incentivizes litigants to reject
what would normally be attractive settlements in favor of pursuing riskier
but potentially more lucrative trial judgments.80 This externality, they
argue, is not good for the courts and the justice system because more cases
take up courts’ and parties’ time and further clog up already-sclerotic
dockets.81 They contend that, coupled with its tendency to promote
frivolous or at least less-than-meritorious lawsuits, litigation finance allows
parties to exploit the judicial system for their own benefit while imposing
harms on the rest of the system.82
77

See Casey Rae, Blurred (Legal) Lines?, FUTURE OF MUSIC COALITION (Mar. 11,
2015, 3:35 P.M.), https://futureofmusic.org/blog/2015/03/11/blurred-legal-lines
(“One thing that doesn’t get pointed out often enough in coverage of these highprofile [music copyright] cases is that infringement lawsuits seem to be mostly
available options to those with deep enough pockets to bring a legal action. We’ve
encountered a number of creators who don’t have the means to protect their works
in the courts due to the high costs of litigation, despite much more clear-cut
examples of infringement. This is something that needs to be discussed.”).
78
See Balganesh, supra note 33, at 2288–89 (“These costs have risen dramatically
over the last decade, which has in turn seen a corresponding reduction in the
number of copyright claims that are actually litigated in court. In 2005, a total of
5,796 new copyright cases were filed. This figure has seen a steady decline since,
and by 2011 this figure shrank to 2,297-an astounding sixty percent drop. The
Copyright Office attributes most of this to the rise in litigation costs . . . .”
(footnotes omitted)).
79
See Rae, supra note 77 (“When [music copyright] cases . . . go to jury, things can
get very interesting and the outcomes are often unpredictable.”).
80
E.g., BEISNER ET AL., supra note 37, at 6.
81
Id. at 4.
82
See id. (“Proponents of third-party litigation financing argue that the practice
promotes access to justice. But this focus on access to justice ignores an obvious
point—third-party litigation funding increases a plaintiff’s access to the courts, not
justice. . . . Practices like third-party funding increase the overall litigation volume,
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Thus, they argue that litigation finance actually fosters an illicit
form of judicial “rent seeking,” a form of path manipulation83 whereby an
actor seeks to benefit his position through strategic participation in a
political or legal system.84
But frequent settlement creates externalities too. By design, the
American legal system heavily depends on courts to develop precedent
when applying broad statutes to discrete facts.85 In doing so, courts clean
up messy drafting or unavoidable lingual inexactitude and keep statutes
current by applying the principles of justice embodied within them to
unforeseeable new scenarios wrought by technological or behavioral
developments.86 Furthermore, precedent is important not just to litigants,
but to markets. That is because precedent begets legal clarity. When the
law is sufficiently clear and detailed, actors know when their behavior
crosses legal boundaries.87 Economic legal regimes like copyright law are
designed to govern business conduct; thus, when the law governing their
transactions is sufficiently clear and detailed, businesses and market
participants can contract, create, and sell without fear of legal retribution.88

including the number of non-meritorious cases filed, and thus effectively reduce
(not increase) the level of justice in the litigation system.”).
83
See Jeremy Kidd, To Fund or Not To Fund: The Need for Second-Best Solutions
to the Litigation Finance Dilemma, 8 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 613, 613 (2012)
(discussing “the danger of path manipulation, a form of judicial rent-seeking” and
explaining that “[i]n a system of binding precedent, litigation financiers will be
faced with incentives to use case selection to maximize profits by pressuring the
courts to open new areas of tort liability”).
84
David R. Henderson, Rent Seeking, THE CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA ECON. (2008),
http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/RentSeeking.html.
85
See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (“It is emphatically
the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is. Those who
apply the rule to particular cases, must of necessity expound and interpret that
rule.”).
86
See William D. Bader & David R. Cleveland, Precedent and Justice, 49 DUQ. L.
REV. 35, 36 (2011) (“Precedent is the cornerstone of common law method, the
conceptual vehicle allowing law and justice to merge as one.”); Anthony Ciolli,
Bloggers as Public Figures, 16 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 255, 273 (2007) (“Courts and
legislatures have altered common law precedents in the past when new
developments, including technological advances, made following precedent
impractical or undesirable.”).
87
See Emily Sherwin, Judges as Rulemakers, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 919, 926 (2006)
(“Precedent rules, when followed, settle controversy and enable individuals to
coordinate their actions.”).
88
Michael P. Van Alstine, Stare Decisis and Foreign Affairs, 61 DUKE L.J. 941,
954–55 (2012) (“Stability functions in tandem with predictability. Adherence to
precedent establishes a framework for efficient public and private planning.”).
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But the system breaks down in a number of ways when settlement
happens so often that it robs courts of flexibility to develop new
precedent.89 Chief among those is that precedent can have the opposite
effect: when precedent across jurisdictions is so infrequent that circuit splits
and ambiguous questions of law linger for years, every new circuit decision
can generate years of confusion when, as in music copyright law, the
Supreme Court is unable or unwilling to step in and settle the issue. The
only parties that benefit from this are lawyers: forum shopping is
inevitable.90 Indeed, one need look no farther than the current split over the
de minimis doctrine in digital sampling to see this effect in full force.91
And, as has been demonstrated, while litigation finance might sometimes
incentivize rejection of fair settlement offers, high litigation costs often
incentivize acceptance of unfair settlement offers.92
In addition to creating those externalities, prohibitive litigation
costs themselves promote an inequitable form of rent seeking. Specifically,
they tend to preclude less-resourced market participants from using the
judicial system to advance their interests.93 What results is a system in
which parties with pockets deep enough to survive protracted litigation can
spend strategically to obtain the precedent (or lack thereof) they want. The
current state of the music industry bears powerful witness to this: it is
widely asserted that the litigation-avoidance regime built up around the
unsettled nature of music copyright law strongly favors the largest and most
well-established market participants.94 As has been discussed, this regime
is not so much the result of unfavorable precedent as it is perpetually
unclear law.95 But actors can seek rent by trying to perpetuate ambiguity
just as much as they can by trying to obtain favorable precedent—especially
when, as in music, perpetual ambiguity clearly favors one party over
another. All of these factors dictate that we must have what we do have:
despite an unprecedented revival in indie labels and niche genres driven by
89

See Neil W. Averitt, The Elements of a Policy Statement on Section 5,
ANTITRUST SOURCE, Oct. 2013, at 3 (describing unpredictability concerns when
“cases are too infrequent for precedents to accumulate rapidly enough”).
90
Wayne A. Logan, Constitutional Cacophony: Federal Circuit Splits and the
Fourth Amendment, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1137, 1183 (2012).
91
See supra notes 52–65 and accompanying text.
92
See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
93
See supra notes 72–73 and accompanying text.
94
See, e.g., Ankur Srivastava, The Anti-Competitive Music Industry and the Case
for Compulsory Licensing in the Digital Distribution of Music, 22 TOURO L. REV.
375, 399 (2006) (arguing that the music industry’s “[s]tructure” preserves majorlabel “[m]onopoly [p]ower”).
95
See supra notes 45–48 and accompanying text. Though, interestingly, denying a
de minimis exception as the Bridgeport court did mostly benefitted large, old labels
with the most extensive catalogs.
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technology platforms like YouTube and Kickstarter that make it
exponentially easier to reach consumers and vie for funding, the legal
regime under which this revival is happening has not kept pace with this
redistribution of market forces.

B. Countering Conventional Criticisms
In light of these realities, musicians should do exactly what
litigation-finance critics say they should not: use litigation finance to
pressure courts to develop precedent that benefits their personal interests.96
While attempting to manipulate judicial decision makers for personal gain
might seem deeply repugnant to notions of fairness at first glance, it is
important to remember that the common law system of incremental
adjudication is designed to accommodate—and indeed depends upon—
strong adversarial representation by self-interested parties.97 But when, as
in music copyright law, litigation costs prohibit less-resourced parties from
effectively aggregating their views across multiple cases and in multiple
courts (both as plaintiffs and defendants), the system is volumetrically
starved of that adverseness. Conversely, litigation finance can mitigate this
problem by providing the financial means for less-resourced parties to
increase the number of cases they can afford to bring or defend, thereby
strengthening their adversarial advocacy in the judicial system. And this
argument is not entirely abstract: one empirical study in Australia found that
the model demonstrably increased the development of precedent in courts
allowing litigation finance.98
Further, at least two additional considerations weigh in favor of
viewing this as a benefit instead of a drawback, at least with respect to
music copyright. First, strategic litigation of the type contemplated here is
96

See Jeremy Kidd, Modeling the Likely Effects of Litigation Financing, 47 LOY.
U. CHI. L.J. 1239, 1268–69 (2016) (“Rent-seeking can also occur . . . through case
selection. Each individual who is involved in a lawsuit will, of course, prefer a
particular outcome. To the extent that people use the judicial branch to pursue
personal goals, then, a very soft form of rent-seeking occurs in nearly every case
and may actually be an integral part of our adversarial system.”).
97
See id. at 1269 (“As an inherently evolutionary system, the common law seems
designed to adapt according to judicial rent-seeking pressures, both benign and
nefarious. The adaptability of the common law is the foundation for the ‘efficiency
of the common law’ hypothesis.” (quoting Paul H. Rubin, Why Is the Common Law
Efficient?, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 65 (1977))).
98
See Abrams & Chen, supra note 30, at 1107 (“Litigation funding does appear to
have precedential value. By two different measures, cases funded by IMF have
greater importance than those they did not fund, but which proceeded to trial in any
case. Funded cases both cite and receive over twice as many references as
unfunded cases. If citations are a good proxy for legal precedent, then third-party
funding appears to promote its more rapid development.”).
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not rent seeking in the same sense as the deleterious conduct the term
usually describes. Traditional critiques of rent seeking focus on ethically
questionable forms of special-interest advocacy like lobbying.99 But
litigation finance does not incentivize this type of rent seeking. Rather,
because prohibitive litigation costs breed one-sided100 rent seeking by
blocking judicial access to less-resourced parties101—which is much more
akin to the traditionally derided types of rent seeking mentioned above—
litigation finance incentivizes efforts to nudge legal precedent back toward
equilibrium with respect to adversarial parity. In other words, by opening
courtroom doors to less-resourced musicians and labels (and leaving them
open long enough for those parties to obtain judicial decisions in lieu of
settlements), litigation finance could allow them to bend the arc of
precedent toward neutral legal principles by strengthening the adverseness
of viewpoints in music copyright lawsuits throughout the nation. And this
adverseness does not just produce one-sided benefits: it is well-established
that judicial systems demonstrably benefit from robust and thorough
debate.102
Second, the copyright regime itself refutes arguments that increased
litigation is bad for the courts and the justice system. As Balganesh points
out, unlike in other regimes, copyright law largely depends on litigation to
validate rights.103 Thus, it is no exaggeration to say that prohibitive
litigation costs fundamentally distort the way that music copyright law is
99

See Richard L. Hasen, Lobbying, Rent-Seeking, and the Constitution, 64 STAN. L.
REV. 191, 197 (2012) (“Lobbyists threaten national economic welfare in two ways.
First, lobbyists facilitate activity which economists term rent-seeking. One
common form of rent-seeking occurs when individuals or groups devote resources
to capturing government transfers, rather than putting them to a productive use, and
lobbyists are often the key actors securing such benefits. Second, lobbyists tend to
lobby for legislation that is itself an inefficient use of government resources, such
as funding the building of a ‘bridge to nowhere.’”).
100
See Kidd, supra note 96, at 1274 (“Litigants will also be more likely to engage
in rent-seeking, and those efforts are more likely to be successful, if strategic
choices are unopposed outside of the individual cases.”).
101
See supra notes 72–73 and accompanying text.
102
See, e.g., Franklin Prop. Tr. v. Foresite, Inc., 438 A.2d 218, 220–21 (Me. 1981)
(noting that “concrete adverseness” is “crucial to the illumination of legal issues
and the proper exercise of judicial power”).
103
See Balganesh, supra note 33, at 2286–87 (discussing why “[c]opyright law’s
basic entitlement structure anticipates and operates in the shadow of private
litigation” and observing that “the copyright entitlement is formally determined for
the first time only during litigation” meaning that “[l]itigation thus performs more
than just a remedial function in copyright law—i.e., merely correcting a harm—but
instead also performs an important constitutive function for the entitlement”
(emphasis added)).
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supposed to work. Here, it is worthwhile to point out concerns over judicial
economy. It is certainly true that more litigation clogs up dockets, but in
light of the need to resort to legal action to vindicate rights, the current
copyright regime is premised upon a high level of judicial involvement.104
Hence, concerns over judicial economy cannot rightly be used to discourage
an access tool like litigation finance that opens doors to the only tribunal
capable of providing relief to aggrieved parties. Nevertheless, judicialeconomy concerns certainly counsel in favor of structural reform of the
current copyright system to make it more accessible and affordable.105
Now, this argument holds true only if litigation finance enables and
promotes an increase in the number of legitimate lawsuits. Frivolous
lawsuits are indeed a form of undesirable rent seeking because they waste
everyone’s time and money, including that of the courts and defendants.106
If allowed to continue too far, they could also coerce defendants into
settling in cases in which they are faultless. They also encourage litigationavoidance strategies like those that have already constricted artistic creation
in the music industry.107

But common sense counters the argument that litigation
finance substantially promotes frivolous litigation. It would make no
sense for litigation financiers to fund bogus lawsuits.108 It stands to
reason that a litigation finance firm facing the all-or-nothing, “go big
or go home” economic proposition associated with a contingency
agreement would take extra precautions to make sure that any
funding application it approves has a realistic chance of succeeding.
And by definition, a suit that has a realistic chance of succeeding is
not frivolous. Not surprisingly, the need to carefully screen funding
applications has led many firms to require applicants to have already
104

Id.
See generally U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, COPYRIGHT SMALL CLAIMS: A REPORT
OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS (2013), https://www.copyright.gov/docs/
smallclaims/usco-smallcopyrightclaims.pdf (analyzing and advancing specific
proposals for the creation of a small claims copyright tribunal to remove many
copyright claims from federal court and make them more affordable).
106
Kidd, supra note 83, at 628–29.
107
See William H. Wagener, Note, Modeling the Effect of One-Way Fee Shifting on
Discovery Abuse in Private Antitrust Litigation, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1887, 1889 n.8
(2003) (“If plaintiffs can extract sizable settlements by filing frivolous lawsuits
capable of surviving motions to dismiss, potential defendants will avoid engaging
in any behavior that possibly could be construed as anticompetitive, further
dampening these firms' incentives to compete aggressively.”).
108
See Martin, supra note 12, at 77 (“No one is going to invest in a frivolous
lawsuit because any money thus invested will be lost.”).
105
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retained lawyers—lawyers bound by ethical rules not to knowingly
pursue frivolous lawsuits—to handle their claims at the time of
application.109 In fact, this has led at least two scholars, Michael
Abramowicz and Omer Alper, to suggest that properly regulated
litigation finance agreements can add a useful layer of additional
gatekeeping on top of those functions contained within the formal
judicial system110 like motions to dismiss and sanctions.
C. Historical Analogies
Finally, proper judicial rent seeking is nothing new. In fact, some
of the key civil-rights developments of the last century resulted at least in
part from strategic use of litigation to develop beneficial precedent. First,
the NAACP’s legendary civil-rights litigation strategies—pioneered by
Thurgood Marshall—led to a number of landmark decisions, including
Brown v. Board of Education, which held that school segregation violated
the Equal Protection Clause.111 Second and more recently, the LGBT-rights
movement’s nationwide litigation strategy—with the civil-rights legal
organization Lambda Legal marching at the vanguard—culminated112 in the
cultural earthquake that was Obergefell v. Hodges,113 in which the Supreme
Court held that state prohibitions of same-sex marriage violated the
Fourteenth Amendment.114
However, these historical analogies also demonstrate that a
litigation strategy is necessary to effectively seek judicial rent. Unlike those
movements, which were coordinated by strong, centralized leadership in the
form of organized advocacy groups, litigation finance is a populist means,
109

See Terry Carter, Cash Up Front: New Funding Sources Ease Financial Strains
on Plaintiffs Lawyers, A.B.A. J., Oct. 2004, at 34, 34 (quoting law professor Lester
Brickman, who argues that litigation finance firms “come in after the lawyer, so
[claims have] nothing to do with frivolous litigation”).
110
See generally Michael Abramowicz & Omer Alper, Screening Legal Claims
Based on Third-Party Litigation Finance Agreements and Other Signals of Quality,
66 VAND. L. REV. 1641 (2013) (“The advent of third-party litigation finance
introduces a new gatekeeper to the legal process.”).
111
See generally Alan Robert Burch, Charles Hamilton Houston, The Texas White
Primary, and Centralization of the NAACP’s Litigation Strategy, 21 T. MARSHALL
L. REV. 95 (1995) (canvassing the development and pursuit of the NAACP’s
masterful litigation strategy).
112
See Jon W. Davidson, What Happened Today at the Supreme Court, LAMBDA
LEGAL BLOG (June 26, 2015), http://www.lambdalegal.org/blog/20150626_victoryanalysis (“Today’s decision rests on the building blocks of prior LGBT rights
victories and of other key civil rights precedents.”).
113
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
114
Id. at 2608.
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not a populist movement. In theory, litigation funding is available to anyone
with a decent legal claim and the time and courage to pursue it. As a result,
absent carefully coordinated action, prospective litigants could conceivably
use third-party funding to harm their own interests by bringing the wrong
cases in the wrong courts115 or defending bad cases in lieu of settling just as
much as they could to help them. Thus, market participants would be wellserved to employ a coherent strategy of targeted planning instead of relying
on individual participants to bring suits sua sponte.
In sum, while litigation finance can help less-resourced market
participants seek rent, it cannot achieve this in a vacuum. Nevertheless,
with a healthy dose of collective action and the right strategy, the model
stands to play an important role in opening courtroom doors to, and shaping
precedential development in favor of, those who were previously shut out
by prohibitive transaction costs.

CONCLUSION
Free markets do not capitulate easily. Despite the oppressive cost
of vindicating one’s legal rights, market participants shaped the music
industry to maximize their ability to cope under the uncertainties and high
costs of American copyright law. Yet because the big labels carried the
most cash and exerted the most influence in times past, they became the
primary architects of the litigation-avoidance regime.
While time has passed and technology has shifted the balance of
power back towards less-resourced actors, the law has not caught up to new
realities. But because litigation finance can advance the cash necessary to
overcome the system’s intrinsic cost barriers, those actors have the
opportunity to demand their voices in the courtroom. With careful planning
and a degree of coordination, they can use litigation finance as a vehicle to
push for greater legal clarity and precedent that benefits their interests. And
even if the precedent cuts against those interests, the system as a whole can
only benefit from greater clarity. Hence, musicians and labels would be
wise to consider a closer look at the ever-growing phenomenon known as
litigation finance.
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See Wyatt Fore, Note, DeBoer v. Snyder: A Case Study in Litigation and Social
Reform, 22 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 169, 195 (2015) (noting the ACLU’s concern
over gay plaintiffs’ anti-discrimination lawsuit because it “presented a chance of
creating bad case law” and thereby undermined the ACLU’s long-term litigation
strategy); see also Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 319 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(recalling the timeless adage that “bad facts make bad law”).

